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ABSTRACT 
This is an ongoing paper that discusses the socio-economics of three neighbouring small towns 
(Humansdorp, St. Francis and Jeffreys Bay) in the Eastern Cape of South Africa, each largely 
dependent on the squid fishery. The paper addresses four issues: (1) the operations of the squid 
industry in South Africa; (2) the local impacts of its operations; (3) the financial stability of the 
industry and (4) the manner in which the resource and the industry are managed by the ministry 
(and the implications of this). The linkages of the squid industry into both the local and 
provincial economies are estimated using mixed data from existing survey and census statistics, 
and from qualitative interviews and questionnaires. The paper also describes the roles played 
by industry participants in the squid value chain. A key element in the debates surrounding the 
management of marine resources is the benefits they provide for previously disadvantaged 
populations. The paper unravels some of the complexities underpinning this issue, in particular 
concerns regarding resource rights, management through closed seasons, and control over 
value chains. The stability and geographical origins of affected communities are focal issues. 
The paper also identifies major costs of industry operations and roughly quantifies them as a 
preliminary to establishing linkages to the local economy.  It is noted that although the different 
vessels in operation vary in size and cost, the basic technology used is similar. The return on 
capital depends, therefore, on the skills of the fishers and the health of the resource.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Being restricted to a small area of the Eastern Cape, it is unsurprising that, although locally 
dominant, the squid industry in South Africa is smaller than the country’s other major sub-
sector fisheries, such as hake, small pelagic, and rock lobster. However, for people in the area, 
squid harvesting is the dominant livelihood. These small areas provides few alternative sources 
of income other than tourism and agriculture. The areas are therefore heavily dependent on a 
resource known for its volatility. This creates uncertainty for both industry participants and 
local businesses in the entire local economy as well as in the squid sector itself, and has made 
finance very hard to obtain (SASMIA 2012), particularly as there is a high dependence on squid 
as a source of income. Although scientists and scholars have tried in the past to explain the 
possible reasons for the volatility of the squid resource (Cochrane et al. 2014), the impacts of 
fluctuations in the catch on the local and provincial economies have not been fully measured. 
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Most of the literature available focuses on the biomass, especially on the volatility of the 
biomass and water quality.  
Measuring the economic value of the squid industry presents some conceptual challenges. A 
general industry is measured by its contribution to the countries’ gross domestic product; it is 
also measured by its total contribution to employment. In the case of the squid industry, we 
ought to include its foreign exchange as the industry is highly export-focused and it is important 
to measure the effect of links to the local economy together with its local importance. This 
involves identifying what sort of substitute activities exist in the areas. Hoagland et al. (2013) 
state that to calculate such an impact, one would need to estimate the sum of the consumer and 
producer surpluses generated by the fishery, including the protection of the species. This, 
however, will not be covered in this paper. 
From DAFF’s perspective, the industry is challenging. Although an individual firm may be a 
simple profit maximizer, the state has a more complex objective function. It is striving to 
generate income, employment, foreign exchange, and stability, and all the while to ensure 
resource sustainability. The problem is finding a management policy that can provide such a 
bounded optimality. 
1.1 Significance of the South African chokka squid fisheries 
The Squid industry is small yet valuable; it is the fourth most valuable fishing industry in South 
Africa, after hake, small pelagics, and rock lobster (Cochrane et al., 2014; Roel et al.,1998). It 
is almost exclusively based on a single species, Loligo Vulgaris Reynaudii, locally referred to 
as ‘Chokka’ and commonly found on the continental coasts of Southern Namibia and along the 
Cape provinces (Augustyn, 1989). Prior to the late 1980s, the chokka squid fishery only existed 
as a “by-catch” of demersal trawlers. Subsequently, an offshore jig fishery was created which 
now accounts for more than 90% of the national squid catch (DAFF. 2010). Since it uses 
handlines, squid jigging is highly labour intensive, providing employment for over 3000 people 
in the Eastern Cape, (SAMIA, 2013). The industry in itself is also volatile because the resource 
is prone to extreme variations; not only between years, but within years. The seasonal 
fluctuations in recent years have been extreme, with large numbers of squid being found in 
coastal waters during the summer months.  
South Africa’s squid industry (and its employees) face many challenges. These include 
resource seasonality, labour intensity, resource and CPUE instability, geographic concentration 
of effort, and specialized non-flexible capital with limited alternative uses. All these challenges 
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render the local economy and its residents vulnerable, not only to the physical condition of the 
resource, but also to such exogenous economic factors as fuel prices, exchange rates, and 
conditions in the global market. 
This paper addresses four issues: (1) the operations of the squid industry in South Africa; (2) 
the local impacts of its operations; (3) the financial stability of the industry; and (4) the manner 
in which the resource and the industry are managed by the ministry, and the implications of 
this.  
1.2 Background and overview of the squid industry 
South Africa’s fisheries sector is a minor component of its economy, bringing in over R3,4 
billion ($236m) of foreign exchange income every year, but contributing only 0.3% to the GDP. 
However, it is locally significant along the western and southern coasts of the country (Stats 
SA, 2016). In those areas, it contributes significantly to employment and often has extensive 
linkages to local small industry. Most sub-sectors in the industry have been operating for a long 
time and are now mature, implying that super-profits of the sort found when a new fish resource 
is mined down from its pristine level can no longer be expected. The stocks of most species, 
including squid, have been fished down, and annual harvests are now driven by levels of 
recruitment and mortality in earlier periods. The industry is managed by a central authority 
within DAFF that allocates long-term rights. Control is effected by restricting either effort or 
offtake in each individual fishery.  
Although artisanal fisheries exist, most of the catches come from commercial operations which 
also provide the bulk of the value addition in the course of processing, marketing, and export. 
This is the case for the hake and small pelagic sectors, though perhaps to a lesser degree for 
rock lobster and squid where the value chains are shorter. All four minor fisheries sectors have 
significant export markets.  
The productive waters of the south and west coasts support a variety of commercially exploited 
marine life, including hake, anchovy, sardine, horse mackerel, and tuna, while more accessible 
species, including rock lobster, squid, line-ﬁsh, abalone, and a range of intertidal resources, 
also provide livelihoods for coastal communities. Fishing rights in most sub-sectors are issued 
both on a short and long-term basis (Zantsi 2012:6). The 3000 jobs in the squid sector are about 
10% of the employment generated by the fishing sector as a whole, but these are concentrated 
along a small segment of the coast. The fishery is believed to generate in excess of R480 million 
($33m) in a good year (DAFF, 2016: 78)  
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Chokka squid are comparatively short lived (roughly eighteen months) and while annual 
recruitment has a clear link to the breeding population in the previous year, it is also directly 
affected by water condition and offshore currents (Sauer 1994 and Roberts 1998). Section 14 
of the Marine Living Resources Act (2005) allows the management of a fishery via effort 
controls. This policy permits the minister to extend the allowable effort and accommodate more 
right holders (as happened in 2005).  
The existing control system sets limits on both the number of fishermen and the number of 
vessels permitted to target squid. Control is also exercised through the use of annual closed 
seasons. At present, these entail a long closure of approximately three months and a shorter 
one of just over a month. For the past four years the closed seasons have been April, May, and 
June, plus 5 weeks over October and November (DAFF, 2016). 
Other forms of control suited to inshore fisheries, such as territorial user rights, are 
inappropriate to the squid fishery. The resource is highly concentrated along a narrow section 
of the coastline. This is indicated in Figure 1 below, which shows the location of the main 
fishing grounds of the chokka squid fishery (indicated by black dots), the 60 m contour line 
(solid line) and the 100 m contour line (dashed line). 
Figure 1: The primary ﬁshing grounds for chokka squid (indicated by the dots) off the southern 
coast of South Africa 
 
Source: K.L. Cochrane et al. / Marine Policy 43 (2014) 
The Eastern Cape Province is one of South Africa’s struggling regions (Stats SA, 2014). The 
triple threats of low growth, unemployment, and inequality are urgent priorities in this 
province, as set out in the National Development plan.  
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The Eastern Cape’s commercial fisheries can be broken down into two sets: largely offshore 
industrialized or capital-intensive fisheries (such as hake trawls and pelagic purse seine 
fisheries), and close-shore smaller-scale and more labour-intensive fisheries (such as line 
fisheries). The squid fishery falls into the latter group. 
Commercial fisheries usually exploit high-value species by targeting stocks. Where there has 
been excessive effort, stock rebuilding may be an important strategy for the commercial 
industry. Such strategies are in place for the squid industry, as well as for the line-fish, rock 
lobster and abalone sectors (FAO 2010). These are supported by the recently recommended 
TAE of 250 000 person-days and a three-month closed season, which has been implemented 
since 2013 to accommodate the allocated crew complement of 2 422. In addition, a 5-week 
closed season (October–November each year) has been implemented with the intention of 
protecting spawning squid and improving recruitment the following year (DAFF, 2016:79). 
As practiced in the Eastern Cape, squid fishing uses simple labour-intensive technology. It 
should therefore be ideal for emergent artisanal fishers and there are indeed rights holders who 
are small-scale fishers. At the same time, squid harvests are primarily directed to the export 
market: the money is in the export value chain, and as such the marketing (including supply 
chain management and HACCP controls) is as important as the catching. As fishing rights 
come up for renewal, a key question for managers of this sector is, therefore, whether or not 
some of the effort should be reserved for small-scale businesses. It has to be established 
whether the small-vessel owners will benefit from this protection or if they just have to sell 
their catch to the bigger operators in any case.  
The squid sector, however, is prone to external challenges as it highly exportable relative to 
any of the other inshore or small-scale fisheries. The focus on export for the squid industry can 
provide incentive for higher catches. Those sub-sectors that focus on exports, particularly the 
squid sub-sector, are geographically localized and have high potential as a source of income 
and employment, if they are properly managed and conditions are good.  
To understand the current state of the industry and the impact of the volatility of the squid 
resource, several factors must be taken into consideration, such as the earnings of fishermen, 
the number of years spent in the industry, contract types, benefits, and ownership in terms of 
BEE. Evidence suggests that the current system is not favourable to workers, as 15% of 
fishermen earn less than R4800 per season during a dry spell (Statistics South Africa, 2015).  
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Zantsi (2012), commenting on the 2005 rights allocation, stated that ownership rested in the 
hands of already-established businesses that were predominantly white, leaving only a handful 
of businesses under black ownership.  The current structure of ownership and fishing rights 
has, however, improved, as this paper will show in later sections. 
The exploitable biomass of squid on the South African coast appears to be volatile, as shown 
by the graph below.  
Figure 2: Annual jig and trawl catches of Chokka squid (tons).  
 
         Source: DAFF, 2016 
 
 
Figure 3: Survey abundance indices for chokka squid and estimated begin-year biomass, 1971–2013 
  
Source: DAFF, 2016 
The squid sub-sector uses hand-operated jigs, making it labor-intensive. Mandating 
sustainability requires a management strategy that provides sustained employment without 
ruining the industry for the next generation (DEAT 2005b). DAFF is not only managing a 
resource, it is also managing an industry. Its mandate is rooted in the Marine Living Resource 
Act (MLRA) of 1998 which requires, not only sustainability, but also transformation (i.e. a 
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management strategy that rectifies the historically racialized imbalances of access to natural 
resources). In order to understand the roles played by each player in the industry, it is important 
to characterize the three places that are significant to the squid industry. 
1.3 Focus areas (Humansdorp, St Francis and Jeffreys Bay) 
For a clear understanding of how the squid industry works, we need to first consider the three 
small centres (i.e. excluding Port Elizabeth) from which it operates: Humansdorp, St Francis, 
and Jeffreys Bay. The local economies of these centres are dominated by three economic 
activities: Fishing, Tourism and Agriculture. The three areas have recently started to develop 
and coordinate regional frameworks and planning institutions in an attempt to promote area-
wide economic growth (Kouga Municipality, 2017: ID7). Institutions targeted have included 
formal and informal business associations, consortia, economic development agencies, and 
networks, the primary objective being to create jobs.  
Table 1: Population Jeffreys Bay, Humansdorp and St Francis, (Sarah Baartman District). 
Kouga Municipality 
 (Population for the major towns) 
Humansdorp Jeffreys Bay St Francis bay Other Total 
28990 27107 4933 37528 98558 
Source: Stats SA, 2011; and Community Survey, 2016 
 
Tourism and fishing are key economic drivers in the three places, providing impetus for linked 
sectors. Dominating the local fishing sector is the squid fishery. Being a single species whose 
stock fluctuates severely means that, while the squid industry benefits the local economy, it 
may also destabilize it.  
Economic activities are not distributed evenly across the three focus areas. Jeffreys Bay is more 
strongly invested in tourism than is Humansdorp, and the port for squid fishing is located in St 
Francis. Both the squid and the tourism industries in all three focus areas have in the past been 
volatile. However, since the squid market is mostly international, its demand-side is less 
affected by changes in local disposable income than by the exchange rate and the condition of 
economies in traditional markets such as Southern Europe and the Far East. Moreover, the 
global market is not simply for a generic squid product. Some export markets prefer large squid, 
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and some small squid; changing demand in specific foreign markets can therefore have 
implications for product pricing and marketing strategies. 
1.4 The Employment Profile 
The squid value chain is far shorter and flatter than the value chains of most other export-based 
fisheries. Consequently, comparatively more of the sector’s employment is made up of 
shipboard jobs, and less of dockside and product processing jobs. Unfortunately, a detailed 
sector-wide breakdown is not yet available. As an indicator, however, Table 2 below presents 
a detailed breakdown that shows the composition of the employment of the fishing sector as a 
whole between 2012 and 2016. 
Table 2: Breakdown of the employment of the fishing sector 
  2012 2013 2014 2016* 
Efective Employment Tonnage for 
HDST 134 722 145 272 144 601 159 321 
Overall Employment in '1000 FTE 
qouta tons 65 65 65 65 
Total Employment 8757 9443 9399 10623 
Sea based 2189 2361 2350 2612 
Shore based 6568 7082 7049 8011 
Employment breakdown     
Admin and Management 350 378 376 489 
Markerting 175 189 188 217 
Sea going 1664 1764 1786 2005 
Shore based 2189 2361 2350 2984 
Processing 4378 4721 4700 7998 
Female 3284 3541 3525 3603 
Source: Lallemand et al 2016. The figures for 2016* are the author’s compilation using the data from DAFF 
2016 and personal consultations. 
 
1.5 Household Profiles 
A local social accounting matrix is a planned long-run output of this study and is still a long 
way from being complete. In the interim, data available from the national SAM is being used, 
with figures related to fishing being the focus of interest. 
Interestingly, the household and the factor components given by the national SAM are derived 
from the merging of the Income and Expenditure Survey (ISSA, 2010/11) with the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS, 2010). The result shows that households that derive income from 
employment in the fishing industry unsurprisingly live mainly in coastal areas, providing a 
large enough sample of the fishing households in coastal areas to justify further analysis.  
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With respect to the income levels of fishing households, the majority of studies in South Africa 
indicate that most households fell into the middle-income group. This means that if South 
African households were to be split into five groups of the same size, in which the income of 
each household is ranked per capita, then most fishing households would find themselves in 
quintiles three and four, as shown in Figure 4 below. Figure 4 places Coloured fishing 
households in quintiles two, three and four, with only Whites reaching quintile five. Black 
African fishing households are spread across the first four quintiles. 1 
Figure 4: Income quintiles of the fishing households 
 
Source: ISSA 2010/11 and LFS 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 The annual mean per capita income levels in 2009/2010 Rands in these fishing households ranged from R892 ($132.54) in 
quintile one, to roughly R6 952 ($1032.98) in quintile three and about R132 413 ($19675.03) in quintile five. 
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1.6 Education 
Figure 5: Educational status of residents: Humansdorp, Jeffreys Bay and St Francis 
 
Source: Stats SA, 2011; and Community Survey, 2016 
 
Figure 5 above shows the educational distribution for the three focus areas. These figures are 
for the general population; it is not yet clear what proportion of these subdivisions are engaged 
in the squid sector. Labour flexibility and mobility (and to a degree bargaining power) depend 
on the level and quality of worker education. Other key factors will be the degree of 
unionisation and the local level of unemployment. There is little evidence of strong 
unionisation in the focus areas, but the larger firms do have worker representatives. The roles 
of unions and worker representatives in the negotiation of worker contracts will be an aspect 
of the ongoing study.  
A number of related issues remain. Are the fishermen happy with the status quo? What are the 
implications of employment as a full time or a part time worker (if any)? Do workers in Port 
Elizabeth (which are purposely excluded in this current study) have a different level of union 
power than workers in the three focus areas? These questions will discussed in section 4. 
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2 LITERATURE 
2.1 Empirical literature 
Most of the existing literature has focused on biophysical aspect of squid. This includes extent 
of the stock, the influence of the reproductive habitat, the impact of directional changes in 
coastal currents on squid abundance, and of water clarity and temperature on catch per unit 
effort (Cochrane et al. 2014). Literature on the economic aspect of the squid industry has, 
however, been limited, particularly on the relationship between the industry, the broader 
economy, and the local area.  
In the few studies that mention the socio-economic issues facing the squid industry (Harris 
2002, Roberts and Sauer 1994, Bergh 2013, etc), there is a general consensus that the squid 
fishery is an important contributor to human well-being in the Eastern Cape Province, but that, 
from a BEE perspective, there is scope for further of transformation and equity. The consensus 
view is that given the lack of experience and capital amongst potential new entrants, the risks 
associated with rapid transformation in this fishery are likely to be high. Such risks would also 
follow rapid allocation of rights to communities (in line with the new small-scale fisheries 
policy). However, they agree that such risks could be mitigated by meeting a number of pre-
conditions. These include not allowing total effort in the fishery to increase, adequate capacity-
building for new entrants, ensuring effective management by the responsible government 
authorities, both individuals and cooperatives, and ensuring new entrants have viable long-term 
business plans (Cochrane et al. 2014; Sauer et al., 2010; Roberts, 2005; Augustyn et al., 1998).  
The literature currently has a gap on the socio-economic impact of the resource stock’s 
volatility and the impact on those that are most vulnerable. In the Eastern Cape, the oncoming 
review of long term rights, together with the new small scale fisheries policy, has prompted 
debate on the possibility of fishermen, and fishing communities, owning their own boats and 
being self-employed, with the assistance of the government. Although the notion appears 
attractive to those seeking opportunities to further racial transformation of ownership, the 
current format of employment contracts appears to offer a valid alternative. 
Under the present system, the captain and crew effectively lease and run the vessel and its 
permit, in exchange for a share of the catch at a preset price per kg. This form of contract 
parallels the sharecropping contract in which workers provide their labour and receive access 
to land in exchange for a present share of the farm’s output. Stiglitz (1974) and Cheung (1969) 
modelled the case of a farm rental contract in which a tenant pays fixed rent for the land and 
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keeps all the net revenue but also bears all the risk, and a sharecropping contract in which the 
tenant pays no rent, but shares the net revenues with the landlord, and also shares the risks. For 
a risk-averse individual, it makes more sense to share the financial risk of a fishing venture 
with workers. Such a contract, as Stiglitz (1974) and Cheung (1969) suggest, means that the 
manager does not carry all the risk of renting or leasing the boat. In coming to this conclusion, 
however, an important proviso is that the terms of the contract should be set in a situation where 
power is not asymmetric: for any set of power relations, the same basic outcome should apply. 
Can the existing contractual system in the squid fishery be further extended to permit captains 
and crews to form long-lasting cooperative structures, to apply for long-term quota or effort 
rights, and then to lease a boat on a sharecropping type contract? It would be interesting to 
evaluate whether splitting the catch with the vessel owner on a fixed ratio, and then being free 
to sell the remainder to any buyer, would yield significant changes. Under such a contract the 
owner of the vessel would be effectively renting it to the captain and the fishing crew, who 
would keep a predetermined proportion of the catch to pay themselves, and would pay rent for 
the vessel by handing the remainder to the vessel owner.  
The political imperative to achieve visible transformation would be addressed by this 
arrangement. However, the question would remain, could the entire fishery be run in such a 
way, and, if it were, would the fishermen be any better off? Would transformation benefit the 
transformed? 
An understanding of the operational structure of the squid industry is important because of the 
role played by domestic and international markets in determining the sector’s profitability. Key 
variables that shape the viability of the industry include exchange rates, the labour contracts in 
operation, the type of product demanded, product prices, the system of resource management, 
the extent to which the wild resource has long-term property rights attached to it, the fleet 
structure, fuel prices, and other running costs such as electricity, maintenance, labour, and 
general vessel-related expenses. The literature covering these key variables is however, limited, 
and this is what the current study hopes to address as part of a larger ongoing study.  
The viability of the industry hinges on two sets of issues: the first comprise economic variables, 
and the second resource issues. The economic factors include product prices, fuel prices, and 
exchange rate, as well as the industry’s structure and the effort control process imposed on it  
from above. The resource issues include the condition and catchability of the resource, their 
13 
 
determinants, whether these have a stochastic dimension, and the role of exogenous 
environmental variables. This means the  link between the health of the stock and the CPUE is 
driven by variables such as vessel captains’ knowledge the resource’s extent and location, and 
their understanding of the significance of other exogenous factors, such as water and weather 
conditions, that affect the catchability coefficient. Such information is crucial for both 
managers of the resource, and managers of the companies that harvest it.  
Mismanagement of these economic and resource issues could cause the collapse of the fishery. 
Roughgarden and Smith (1996) make an interesting case on why fisheries collapse and what 
can be done about it. They suggest that a fishery should be managed for ecological stability 
rather than allowing harvesting in an ecologically unstable equilibrium. They further expand 
their case by pointing out that such an ecological stable target stock may be attained either by 
annual variation in quotas or through taxation of landings. With longer lived species, next 
year’s population often depends critically on this year’s escapement. Roughgarden and Smith’s 
approach is, however, less reliable for short lived species whose populations are naturally prone 
to extreme natural fluctuations. This is the case with squid, a resource for which a season’s 
harvest is less clearly determined by the previous season’s escapes.  
If the focus is on social rather than ecological conditions, over-regulation can still cause the 
collapse of a fishery. Zantsi (2012) warns that policy that emphasizes the welfare of workers 
above the sustainability of companies, is mutually destructive - a trade-off must be made to 
ensure that companies and workers can co-exist (Zantsi, 2012). 
A feature dominating the literature on chokka squid is the catch’s propensity to sudden crashes. 
It is not wholly clear to what extent these parallel the resource stock, the population may be 
crashing, but it may alternatively be relocating, or its catchability may have fallen. In such a 
fishery the optimal method of control is far from clear. The ideal method of controlling harvests 
in a fishery characterized by stock uncertainty has long been a topic of debate. Weitzman 
(2002) compares the merits of landing fees and harvest quotas using a stochastic model to 
demonstrate variations in the fish stock under uncertain conditions. Conventional wisdom 
among fisheries economists is that landing taxes are inferior to quantity controls as instruments. 
Weitzman, however, argues that a landing fee is always superior to a harvest quota, and stresses 
that this is especially true when the condition of the resource is unknown ex ante. It is 
important, in the context of Weitzman’s argument, to evaluate what effect a landing fee system 
would have on the squid sub-sector, especially whether it would be more effective at restricting 
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effort than the current method. It would be necessary to evaluate whether it can be sustained, 
particularly if external factors, such as the exchange rate or fuel prices, were to change, and 
whether it would secure the resource better than a closed season. 
Grafton et al. (2006) argue that direct controls are less important than the management of fisher 
motivation when managing fisheries. They use evidence from more than a dozen natural 
experiments in commercial fisheries to argue that incentive-based approaches, which better 
target community and individual harvests, promote sustainable fisheries. They further argue 
that territorial rights and price ecosystem services, coupled with public research, monitoring, 
and effective oversight, also promote sustainable fisheries.  
In response to Weitzman, a paper by Danielsson (2001) explains the advantages of “catch and 
effort quotas” in the presence of risk by using a general bioeconomic model. The model 
addresses the biological dynamics of the fish stock and “catch per unit effort”. It develops a 
method for comparing the efficiency of control variables in a stochastic dynamic programming 
model which is applied to the management of the fisheries with catch and effort quotas. The 
lessons on variations in fish stock drawn from this paper can be applied to the squid industry. 
2.1.1 Job creation and livelihood  
Many rural communities in the Eastern Cape, rely heavily on the fishing industry (DAFF, 
2016:78). The structure of the fishing sector, particularly the squid sub-sector, is designed to 
give income to both employers and employees, creating a direct and indirect connection of the 
circular flow of income that is powered by a sustainable fishery. It has been argued that free 
access to fisheries would help the local poor to improve their standards of living, but the 
common demand that government should give people the right and the ability to fish for 
subsistence also poses major problems for DAFF. The issue in this case is that the government 
is supposed to be creating jobs and giving the people access to national assets. However, 
achieving that speedily will mean that there will be a significant decline in catches (DAFF, 
2016:78).  
2.1.2 Value chain  
Catching squid is only the first step in an industrial value-chain process. Squid has to be frozen, 
packaged, transported, marketed, and delivered abroad. At each stage the value increases. The 
process, and the increases in value per kg that accompany it, constitute the squid value chain. 
A fundamental challenge for small enterprises is that the ability to catch squid does not bring 
with it the ability to access or control the value chain. In this ongoing study, an estimate of the 
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slope of the value chain would be useful to establish the selling price for a squid dockside, and 
evaluating its worth when landed in European markets. 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
The management of marine resources commonly involves two points of focus: the health of 
the resource, and the economic rents it can generate. The former requires an understanding of 
the resource, its life-cycle, its environment, and the natural risks to both. The latter requires an 
understanding of the industry, its structure, the costs of entry and exit, the points of mark-up 
along the value chain, the costs of monitoring effort and the harvest, and the determinants of 
the operational costs and revenue. 
The squid sector can be analyzed using conventional stylized models such as the Schafer or 
Ricker Models, or age cohort approaches such as Beverton and Holt’s. However, it will be 
shown that the means by which the local species of squid is harvested (hand-lining into 
breeding aggregations) means that a more nuanced analysis is needed. 
2.2.1 Gordon-Schaefer Model 
The simplest contributing model in applied fishery is the Schaefer model. This particular model 
focuses on points fundamental to all fisheries with its unique bioeconomic application to the 
fishing industry. The model can be used to compute the desired maximum sustainable yield by 
taking into consideration biological growth rates, total costs and revenues, carrying capacity, 
and marginal costs and revenues for the respective fishing industry. 
The important feature of the model is that Gordon’s version of it demonstrates how sensitive a 
renewable fish resource can be to the harvesting process selected (Shah and Sharma, 2003:43-
49). Clark’s (2010) shows that while open access in itself threatens the existence of rents, open 
access together with certain characteristics of the species harvested can threaten the resource’s 
survival as well. In particular, the characteristics of these types of species involve aspects of 
behavior that keep catches as a function of the resource stock. If that is not the case (i.e. a 
species that can be fished at low cost in breeding aggregations or along narrow migration 
routes), then open access and low entry cost bring a substantial risk of commercial or even 
physical extinction, especially where the stock is volatile and difficult to predict, making a 
TAC-based system an impossibility. What the model shows is that a sustainable strategy will 
need a limit on effort – such as a closed season.  
This is precisely the justification of the control system used for the South African squid 
industry, and seems to be understood by corporate managers interviewed. However the pattern 
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of closed seasons causes great difficulty for the crews of squid vessels. In interviews, it soon 
became clear that the actual fishermen do not understand the background to this system of 
control, and it causes significant disaffection. 
In a nutshell, Gordon’s model shows that overharvesting destroys rents. The question of how 
to reduce effort still remains. Gordon makes some interesting comments towards the end of his 
article, largely explaining how the models are structured to focus on the market rather than the 
resource (i.e. fish). 
While the model is valuable for mapping economic efficiency, further analysis needs to be 
done to measure the deep socio-economic impact and welfare measurements.  
Age-structured models consider factors affecting biomass through time, such as growth, 
recruitment and mortality, in a population homogeneously distributed in space and time. These 
models often follow the approach of Beverton and Holt (1957), and explicitly include the age 
structure of the population. Beverton and Holt modelling uses a different warning system to 
predict oncoming collapse, the warning being focused on catch at length data instead of falls 
in CPUE. This simply means that the greater the number of small catches in comparison to big 
catches, the greater the risk that the resource is being overfished. The more small individuals, 
and the smaller the proportion of large ones, in the catch, the closer one is to a collapse  
The disadvantage of the management techniques mentioned is that fishermen end up carrying 
much of the resource risk. This is because they get paid only for what they catch, which means 
no income on days when they have no catch. The opportunity cost is also high for the fishermen 
because they would have otherwise spent their time searching for alternative income. Even 
though fishermen bear majority of the risks, the impact is however transmitted to the population 
and local business community, because of the decline in disposable income leading to a 
decrease in the purchasing power of the fishermen and their dependents.  
2.2.2 The Input/ Output Model (I/O) 
Any attempt to model the impacts of changes in the squid stock that only looks at the fishery 
itself clearly misses an important issue. In a small local economy, which is heavily dependent 
on the resource, the fishery has backward and forward linkages that may have far wider effects 
(Hirschman, 1958). An important question is therefore: are the impacts of variations in the 
squid stock primarily felt through linkages between the industry and local firms, or through 
expenditure by workers employed in the industry? To answer this, two tools need to be 
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developed, an I/O table and a Social Accounting Matrix. In a fully-defined model of this nature 
it is standard practice to evaluate also the impact of the employment change on household 
income. As industry income changes, industry participants are able to spend and/or save more, 
which has a further feedback effect on the production side of the economy. Since this model 
excludes the feedback effect of industry, the danger exists that the overall welfare effect is 
underestimated. However, in a fixed-price model there is also the danger that the overall 
welfare effect is overestimated, since prices adjust as household demand fluctuates, and 
variations in household demand are not balanced by prices. Our welfare estimates are therefore 
perhaps conservative, but certainly not underestimated. This is explained further in the SAM 
below.   
2.2.3 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
The SAM is a useful tool for most impact studies as it represents the flows of all economic 
transactions that take place within a country and can also be used in provincial and local 
analyses. Essentially, it is simply a matrix representation of the National Accounts, which can 
also be extended to include non-national flows. A SAM is a square matrix in which each 
account is represented by a row and a matching column, such that each shows the payment 
from the account of its column to the account of its row. Calibrating a simple SAM model starts 
with deriving the coefficient matrix. The multiplier formula is therefore: 𝑍=(1−𝑀)−1𝐸  
This simply tells us that when a particular exogenous demand E increases (for example), then 
when one accounts for all rounds of direct and indirect linkage effects, the result will be a final 
increase in total demand equal to Z.  
The SAM has advantages, as it can easily be extended to include other flows in the economy 
and is a relatively efficient way of presenting data, since it can disaggregate a large share of 
economic activities to smaller groups to show the effect of each group. However, SAMs also 
certainly have weaknesses. These general limitations result from restrictive assumptions made 
that all firms in a given industry employ a constant production average of inputs, output, labour, 
and technology, and produce identical products, so that the model assumes there are no 
economies or diseconomies of scale in production or factor substitution.  
Previous literature shows that there are many distinct approaches that can be followed to 
examine the overall welfare effects of a change in employment associated with the various 
export shocks. The disaggregated I/O analysis can be useful if full data is available, and one 
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can also use different multivariate statistical techniques to arrive at a plausible distribution of 
employment gains in the economy. A combination of surveys by Stats SA, academics, and 
Kouga community survey data provides background information about conditions in the 
fishing sector of the study area. The I/O and SAM models are only mentioned for completeness 
because this paper is part of an ongoing study, but they will not be used in the current paper. 
2.2.4 Welfare measurement 
It is common for welfare to focus on household incomes and the prices households pay for a 
given consumption bundle. The welfare situation in the three focus areas has, however, further 
dimensions: the income insecurity related to the nature of the wage contract, the instability of 
the resource and the volatility of the global squid market. The study recognizes that the welfare 
effects of income are not linked to the mean level, but to the variation around it, and in 
particular to income insecurity. The I/O model that is briefly outlined above assumes that prices 
are constant and not open to variation at the whim of the producer (no monopoly power). 
Although squid prices demonstrably fluctuate, much of the national catch is internationally 
tradable. Since South Africa is a price taker in the global fish market, it can be argued that this 
is a fair assumption. The squid fishing and fish processing industries are small relative to the 
rest of the economy and to the world market for fish. Consequently the welfare impact that 
needs to be analysed is effectively an income effect, caused by changes in total value added.  
An increase in value added can be interpreted in a number of ways. Value added consists of 
payments for factors of production, and is the product of the employment level and wages, and 
hence a rise in value added can be interpreted as an increase in wages or employment or both. 
The question that seems to arise for most researchers is “Which approach is best suited to the 
South African economy?” Typically, the approach followed allows for skilled workers to be 
fully employed at flexible wages, while unemployment among semi- and unskilled workers 
keeps their wages fixed. However, in a fixed price I/O model it makes some sense to allow 
wages to vary, and consequently we opt for the ‘excess capacity’ assumption. Given the small 
magnitude of the shock, it is also reasonable to assume that this excess capacity exists at the 
prevailing wages for many skill levels. Furthermore, since the fishing industry in particular is 
fairly low-skill intensive, the demand effect for scarcer high-skilled workers is likely to be 
small. Once again, this is part of the ongoing study and some of the results of the industry 
interviews will be discussed in the results section. 
2.3 Regulation of the squid-fishing industry  
The recent Long-term Rights Allocation Management Process (2015) has strongly allocated 
some of the squid rights to the collective workers. There is a new reallocation currently under 
way and acts as an additional source of uncertainty in the industry. 
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The following table puts the racial composition of the squid sector’s fishing rights into an 
industry-wide perspective 
Table 3: Shift of white permit holders to black in the fishing sector. 
SECTOR 2001 2005 2009 2017* 
Squid 33 48 45 49 
Hake Deep Sea trawl 25 27 59 56 
South Coast Rock 
Lobster 
72 71 79 64 
Horse Mackerel 41 43 38 41 
Hake Inshore Trawl 42 48 99 82 
Small Pelagics 75 61 51 60 
Patagonian Toothfish 40 58 47 60 
KZN Prawn Twal 17 63 40 59 
Demersal Shark 50 73 86 69 
Hake longline 90 91 92 80 
Seaweed 43 55 6 14 
Tuna Pole 43 55 50 42 
West Coast Rock 
Lobster 
60 62 73 70 
Source: DAFF (personal communication) & the asterisk indicates the author’s calculation for 2017 
Table 3 shows the percentage of black ownership in 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2016, as a percentage 
of rights permit holders with over 50 % ownership allocation / total allocation. In almost all 
sectors, there has been an increase in the black ownership and the amendment of regulations 
has been effective. Gaps in the literature and methods still exist, however, and the limitation of 
the availability of recent data has led the current study to focus more on quantitative measures 
than on qualitative analysis. This study is therefore essentially a means of gathering and 
combining the existing information to create a foundation for detailing the entire 
socioeconomic effect of volatility in the squid industry in the ongoing study. 
 
3 METHODS 
This study was exploratory in nature and collected both qualitative and quantitative data. A 
descriptive design was used to collect information. Such a design is important for the collection 
of primary data that will be used to inform decisions and recommendations (Creswell, 
2009:190).  
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3.1 Sampling procedure and data collection 
The study relied heavily on probability sampling restricted to the squid industry. Probability 
sampling determined the likelihood of any fishermen in the squid group being selected to 
answer the questionnaire. Thereafter, a stratified sampling method allowed the researcher to 
divide the population into groups that differ in many ways (i.e. fishermen, vessel owners, and 
local businesses).  
Interviews were conducted with the 5 major companies (vessel owners) in the three focus areas. 
The process was extended to include other local businesses (both formal and informal) in the 
communities.  
In this study, the target was limited to three basic groupings: fishermen employed in the chokka 
squid industry by one of the identified major companies, the management of the vessel owning 
firms that employ fishermen in the three focus areas, and local (non-fishing) businesses within 
the communities where the squid industry operates.  
The reason for probability and stratified sampling of all three key groups is to observe a 
representative sample of persons ‘interested and affected’ by the condition of the squid 
industry. The study also focused on the fishermen’s experiences, as well as on their opinions 
regarding the issues facing the chokka squid industry. Dividing the targets into three groups 
allowed the researcher to find the total number of non-executive employees and thus calculate 
the percentage points in each group. The stratified sampling method required dividing the 
sample population into subgroups, followed by random selection of subjects from each 
subgroup (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). 
65 questionnaires were initially distributed to fishermen; 5 companies were interviewed, and 
25 local businesses in the focus areas were randomly identified and interviewed. It is important 
to note that only 60 questionnaires were completed and returned by the fishermen, reducing 
the number of observations from 95 to 90. 
3.1.1 Questionnaires 
The first section of the questionnaire requested biographical data; the second part focused on 
the fishermen’s role in the industry and  their understanding of it. Lastly, the questionnaires 
tried to collect information that would indicate the linkages between fishing incomes and the 
local economy, i.e., their impact in a broader economic context. A copy of the questionnaire 
that was distributed to the fishermen is contained in appendix 2. 
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3.1.2 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the management of vessel-owning firms 
(employers) and with managers of local businesses. The interviews were intended to provide a 
picture of the industry, the relative magnitudes of costs and linkages to other local firms, the 
nature of employment contracts, the risks faced by the industry, and the relationship with 
government. Interviews were also conducted with firms, both formal and informal,  that depend 
indirectly on the health of the squid stock. These attempted to elicit information on the impact 
of the squid catch volatility on their enterprises, and whether these were direct (as linkages to 
the industry), or indirect (via employees of the squid sector).  
3.2 Data Analysis 
The data in this study was analyzed by using descriptive statistic methods with Microsoft Excel. 
Trek (2016) explains descriptive statistics as methods which are typically used for eliminating 
data by set of measurement and quantitative data presenting information graphically or in a 
table. The quantitative method for evaluating the information obtained in this study was the 
modified Schaefer model. This type of model is tractable and simple, making it useful for 
heuristic purposes, even if it tends to ignore the underlying natural volatility of species like 
squid. 
The Schaefer model calculations and results largely depended on the establishment of annual 
catches per unit effort and the data collected about squid catches and effort would allow 
estimation of the parameters. The ‘efforts’ in the Schaefer model was calculated using the TAE 
– the number of allowable fishermen (crew), see DAFF, 2016.   
3.3 Ethical considerations 
The author of this study obtained permission from the Ethics Research Committee of the 
Commerce Faculty of the University of Cape Town. The proposal and questionnaires were 
both submitted to the Ethics Committee for approval and received ethical clearance. The ethical 
clearance letter is copied in appendix 2. 
4 RESULTS 
Local information suggests that squid volatility affects the industry’s participants in broadly 
the same way but with different magnitude. We first need to view and observe the trend of the 
squid catches to analyse the behavior of the players in the industry when the catches fluctuate. 
This will allow us to proceed with a critical assessment of the information to determine how 
each agent can best react and intervene. There is a need to study the major key players 
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responsible for the day-to-day activities of the squid sector as there might be a strong 
correlation between the role-players and the squid-stock volatility. 
Successfully modelling a Schaefer model largely depends on getting the right statistics for the 
total squid catches, from jig and as by-catch from trawl, as well as squid TAE over the period 
2003–2017. The table on appendix 1 shows the published catches, as given by DAFF, from 
2003 to 2014. In this, the “catches” for 2015-2017 used the average mean from the data 
collected when the vessel owners (employers) had to answer a question relating to the catches 
of the previous 5 years. It should be noted that the bycatch figures do not closely parallel the 
hand-line catches. Since effort was relatively stable across the entire period, CPUE should have 
been a good proxy for resource (spawning stock) biomass if the catchability coefficient was 
stable. This would be determined by water clarity. 
4.1 The Schaefer Model 
Table 4 below expresses the squid harvest in a Schaeffer format, where CPUE proxies 
spawning biomass, since the technology targets this section of the squid population. 
Table 4: Squid landings (catches), effort and catch per unit effort 
Year Catch (tons) [H] Max Allowable 
Effort (crew) [E] 
CPUE [H/E] catch per 
crew member 
2003 11820 2423 4,9 
2004 13261 2423 5,5 
2005 9147 2423 3,8 
2006 9291 2423 3,8 
2007 9 438 2423 3,9 
2008 9 021 2423 3,7 
2009 10 341 2423 4,3 
2010 10 777 2423 4,4 
2011 7 796 2423 3,2 
2012 6 458 2423 2,7 
2013 2 705 2423 1,1 
2014 6 983 2423 2,9 
2015 7 895 2423 3,3 
2016 9 564 2423 3,9 
2017 8 622 2423 3,6 
Note: effort data includes the unrestricted number of crew at sea on a squid vessel  
Source: Author’s compilation using the data from DAFF 2016 and information (averages) from the companies. 
 
If CPUE proxies spawning biomass, then Table 4 provides a typical general surplus yield 
model. An important feature of this model is that there is a stock externality: the more effort is 
applied, the fewer squid are left, and the higher the next fisherman’s marginal cost of catching 
one. The model is inherently stable: in the event of heavy fishing the level of stock reduces, 
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but in the absence of an Allee effect (depensation), it will always rebound. Figure 6 below 
shows this in detail using the CPUE and the yield. 
 
Figure 6: The relative magnitudes of the spawning biomass over the period 2003 to 2017. 
    
Source: Author’s compilation 
The diagram shows major inter-annual fluctuations - the catch is volatile for exogenous 
reasons, and not because of increased or decreased fishing pressure in earlier years. While the 
graph appears to show a declining trend, removing the two outliers (2004 & 2013) would leave 
the trend line almost horizontal.  
It would be interesting to work out the predicted yield, but information on the ground strongly 
suggested that there may be other factors one would need to consider which would be likely to 
change the function and slope of the model. This is likely to make the function non-linear and 
therefore one might need a different stochastic model which would capture other information 
about the squid industry. 
4.2 Industry role-players 
Given that the squid industry has over the past years generated an estimated amount of R480 
million per year, its contribution to the local economy is significant (DAFF, 2016:78). Despite 
this monetary significance, the volatility in catches has profound implications for all role 
players in the sub-sector. It is therefore necessary to understand how these risks are shared and 
mitigated across industry players. 
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The nature of a firm’s contract with its employees is structured so as to share risks. In most 
South African industries, companies carry the bulk of risk: in a cyclical downturn they cannot 
lay workers off easily, cannot lower wages, and typically pay wages determined through 
centralised bargaining. Market conditions, therefore, have limited effects on the conditions 
faced by employees, though the process encourages labour saving in the economy as a whole. 
The squid fishery, however, has a labour contract that shares the risk between the fishermen 
and the firm (Zantsi, 2012).  Stiglitz (1974) and Cheung (1969) in the literature on 
sharecropping contracts, where tenants do not pay rent but share the net revenues and risks 
with the landlord, suggest that such contracts encourage employment and investment in the 
industry. Unfortunately, it also means that the workforce’s disposable income is unstable; in a 
bad season it falls and in a good season it rises. 
4.2.1 Fishermen 
A typical workday at sea begins for the fishermen at sunset when the vessel lowers its lights 
into the water. They fish, jigging with hand lines, until the following morning. Each worker’s 
individual catch for the evening is weighed before being flash-frozen. 
Most of the workers in the fishing industry come from the poorer sectors of the community; in 
other respects, however, the industry is one of the most diverse in South Africa. Most crew 
members come from rural areas within the Eastern Cape, Kwa-Zulu Natal, and also a few from 
Lesotho. Squid fishermen eat and work on the ocean, spending approximately 132 days and 
nights at sea, making it their second home. Most fishermen agree that there is nothing more 
enticing and yet enslaving than life at sea, because although they risk their lives, they are still 
able to earn a source of income to provide for themselves and their families. Although they 
earn an income at the end of the trip, the costs involved in preparation for sea are sometimes 
high, especially if the fishermen (rather than the vessel owner) bear the costs themselves (i.e. 
pre-sea certificate, medical checkup, transport costs, etc.) or where companies deduct these 
expenses from post-trip payments.  
Most squid fishermen do not get paid a set salary, however, there is a statutory minimum 
wage— it is low, but they still get it if catches are poor. Thus, as catches increase, the pay rises 
above the minimum, and in a good season they can do well. The norm is therefore a contract 
which offers a floor wage, but in which actual (catch related) earnings are expected to be 
greater. This means that there is never a guarantee of a fixed income because the catch is 
unpredictable. In a bad month, they can earn as little as R300 after deductions, but can bring 
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home up to R8000 for three weeks of fishing in a good one. In addition, they earn a commission 
on the crew catch for every kg caught, which can range from R11 to R15 per kg. In large firms, 
they are guaranteed R90- R110 per day in the unlikely event that they do not catch an average 
of 10kg per day for the trip.  
The bargaining power of fishermen is limited because only half  of fishermen interviewed have 
been unionized. One reason is that differences in the political affiliations of the union heads, 
and compromised leadership has weakened their bargaining power. During the closed season, 
most fishermen look for piece-work employment in other low-skilled jobs as they do not have 
the skills required to transition easily to alternative full-time employments. The data suggest 
that most settle for construction-type jobs or anything available at the time. 
The table below summarizes the findings of the study to give an overall picture of the 
distribution and characteristics of the fishermen that work in the squid industry. The 
dependency ratios for the squid fishermen who were breadwinners were calculated by 
aggregating the number of dependent children (those under 15 years) and of the elderly (older 
than 65 years) in the families, then dividing that total by each area’s working age population 
and expressing the result as a percentage. In a normal season, the study assumes full 
employment, therefore the 11.8% is split among the 5 groups, adding 2.36% to each group. 
The same is done for Jeffreys Bay, with 4.04% being added to each group, and St. Francis 
(3.16% to each group). 
Table 5: Household income and characteristics of sampled squid fishermen and general 
populations in Greater Humansdorp 
 Humansdorp  Jeffreys Bay  St Francis Bay  
 Sampled 
Squid 
fishermen 
2017 
Stats SA, 
Survey  
Consensus 
Sampled 
Squid 
fishermen 
2017 
Stats SA, 
Survey  
Consensus 
Sampled 
Squid 
fishermen 
2017 
Stats SA, 
Survey 
Consensus 
Number of households 18 5061 23 10 327 19 1665 
Average household 
size 
6.3 3.8 8.1 2.5 3.9 2.5 
       
Education  
No Schooling 50% 2.6% 60.9% 4.9% 47.36% 2.6% 
Incomplete schooling 33.3% 45.8% 26.1% 61.4% 42.10% 54.7% 
Matric 16.67% 34.8% 8.6% 26.4% 10.52% 28.4% 
Post-school qualification 0% 16.8% 4.35% 7.2% 0% 14.2% 
       
Dependency ratio 60 56.6 82 57 49.1 49 
Working age  63.8%  63.7%  67.1% 
Average trips per 
year 
10  11  9  
Average catches (tons) 3  2  2  
Annual income (2017 
prices) (for squid 
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fishermen in bad 
seasons) 
< R4 800 54% 15.1% 61% 23% 58% 18.9% 
R4 801–R9 600 42% 5.8% 30.4% 4.8% 25% 5.3% 
R9 601–R19 600 4% 15.6% 8.65 12.2% 17% 14.2% 
R19 601– R38 200 0% 22% 0% 14.2% 0% 20.8% 
> R38 201 0% 41.5% 0% 45.8% 0% 40.8% 
Annual income (2017 
prices In a normal 
season) 
 
< R4 800 4% 5.66% 7% 6.84% 10% 6.26% 
R4 801–R9 600 26% 8.16% 22% 8.84% 26.4% 8.46% 
R9 601–R19 600 65% 17.96% 57% 16.24% 55% 17.36% 
R19 601– R38 200 4% 24.36% 9.66% 18.24% 8.6% 23.96% 
> R38 201 1% 43.86% 4.34% 49.84% 0%% 43.96% 
Note: For the census data, education is for the household head. Source: Statistics South Africa 2011; data collected 
by Senzo P. Mthembu for 60 squid fishermen for 2017 
Table 5 shows how income changes from a bad season to normal one. The information 
collected suggests that in a bad season, none of the crew members earn more than R19 600 per 
month. Those that come closest to earning that amount are doing more than just fishing: these 
include vessel skippers, and fishermen who cook at sea. There is, however, a discrepancy 
between the earnings reported by fishermen and the full costs of employment that the 
companies report paying. One possibility is that participants may not respond truthfully, either 
because they cannot remember, or because they omit less visible aspects of their pay package. 
They may also misrepresent their earnings strategically, or to enhance their social acceptability. 
These are well-known weaknesses of self-reporting.  
Throughout the survey, an issue that arose repeatedly was the lack of trust between industry 
participants. Social fragmentation amongst fishermen along racial and tribal lines seemed 
common, and in some cases reportedly contributed to incidents of violent on board protest over 
poor catches. A ‘blame game’ seemed an inevitable consequence of poor catches; in some 
cases, the crew would blame the skipper or vice versa when the catch was insufficient to cover 
the amount spent on shipboard rations.  
The lack of trust also manifests in the relationship between fishermen and companies. 
Recognizing the problem of zero-earnings in the closed season, some vessel owners offered to 
provide an income smoothing scheme, but this was rejected by fishermen, who indicated a lack 
of confidence in the companies. The intention had been to set aside a percentage of fishermen’s 
earnings, which would then be disbursed as a buffer during the closed season, but opposition 
by fishermen forced the firms to drop the saving plan. 
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4.2.2 Companies (vessel owners) 
The collected information identified five leading companies, all of which are vessel owners. 
The five biggest companies in the three focus areas, ranked in order of quantity caught, are 
Balobi, DMA Fishing, Frontline Seafood Traders, Komicx Products (Pty) Ltd., and Vukani 
Fishing (Ocean Sun). There are other, smaller, stakeholders in the area, some of whom are new 
entrants and own small vessels. Discussions with the management of some of these firms 
indicated an unofficial market in squid permit. There is also a domestic market for squid (from 
local small operations to larger export-focused processors); this forms part of the value chain. 
Information also reveals that while some permit holders own the vessel they operate, others do 
not.  
The vessels owners reported in the interviews that 99% of their non-labour expenditures take 
place in Port Elizabeth; this includes maintenance and other items necessary for the daily 
running of their business.  
The firms interviewed attributed 65% of vessel operating costs to labour, paid in the form of 
wages to fishermen. The fishermen in turn spend much of this money in the three focus areas. 
This is critical to the issue of linkages, because it indicates that the impact of the squid industry 
on the local economy comes via workers. 
Risk mitigation is clearly important where the target resource is unstable. This is often achieved 
by risk spreading, and the exploitation of economies of scale and scope. The big companies are 
involved in more than just the squid fishery, and typically have a range of permits. During the 
squid closed season they can continue to fish for hake, snoek, and other fish. Unfortunately, 
small and new firms suffer from having fewer opportunities for risk spreading. They are less 
likely to have spare vessels and alternative permit, and the smaller (and older) vessels are less 
able to cope with good catches when they occur. In this respect the capacity of the flash-
freezing system is critical. Smaller flash-freezing systems may mean that good catches are 
wasted: either the crew stops fishing till there is freezer space, or the catch deteriorates and 
brings lower prices. All companies revealed that the maintenance of vessels is a considerable 
expense, and in discussion it was suggested that bigger vessels would only become viable if 
CPUE rose.  
In early 2018, supplying a typical small squid vessel for 21 days at sea required approximately 
3000 litres of diesel at a cost of R38 000 (this is before the sharp rises in diesel prices in 2018). 
Together with food and all the other supplies necessary for the crew and trip, the total cost was 
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over R60 000. All of the costs are carried by the companies in large firms, but food expenses 
are sometimes shared with the crew by small firms. To manage these costs, some vessel owners 
in small firms choose to hire a crew that is particularly vulnerable, which enables them to make 
significant cash outlays to cover their rations and cooking on board. Companies may also incur 
additional costs when they choose to send new fishermen for sea-safety training before they 
start working, but they do not always choose to do so, as the pre-season training is done by an 
external company. Internal training of new recruits takes the traditional form of “on the job-
training”, while formal training may be offered through mentorship programmes with 
established vessels, and seamanship courses for powered vessels. 
The squid fishery, with its smaller vessel sizes and its reliance on hand-jigging methods, has a 
much higher labour/capital ratio than other fisheries. An average fisherman will catch about 2 
tonnes of squid over a normal season, resulting in annual wages of R24 000 in 2017 Rands. 
When catches are low, the data suggests that vessel owners struggle to earn enough to cover 
the variable costs of each trip, and will still have to pay their fixed costs, which include the 
minimum wages of the fishermen. This is the case for all firms.  
In bad seasons, the distribution of risk between firms and workers varies from firm to firm, and 
this is apparent in the way their cost structures change between good and bad seasons. For the 
reasons already mentioned, such as smaller freezers, older vessels, limited alternative permit, 
and a lower ability to hedge costs and revenues, the revenue volatility of small firms is likely 
to be greater than that of larger enterprises. 
 
Results from those that were interviewed suggest that in large companies, workers get paid 
during a bad season regardless of the amount of squid caught. Another way which large and 
small firms differ is in the duration of the employment contracts they offer. Larger firms having 
established workforces with secure employment, while smaller firms tend to hire part-time 
workers on short term contracts. The pay contracts that currently exist have been the subject of 
much contestation. This is because many are short-term in nature, with little focus on permanent 
employment. A new standardized contract between the fishermen and the companies is 
currently being drafted and is expected to be finalized by the end of 2018. This new contract 
will ensure that both small and large firms offer secure long-term employment. It will also give 
clarity on issues such as Unemployment Insurance Fund, pension funds and medical aid. 
Currently benefits such as UIF, medical health insurance, and pension fund are recognized in 
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medium-term contracts, but these are commonly offered only by large firms, as small firms tend 
to offer short-term contracts.  
 
During poor seasons companies necessarily adopt loss-mitigating strategies. These also impact 
workers and local firms. One common such strategy is to reduce the number of days at sea 
whenever weather or sea conditions appear poor. This strategy affects the incomes of workers 
directly.  
 
As squid is 99% exported, the prices are strongly determined and sensitive to outside market 
forces, and companies must always keep in mind the world squid stock and catches, exchange 
rates, supply, and demand as Zantsi (2012) suggests. The squid fishery in particular is open to 
fluctuations in many different factors. The history of all squid fisheries shows tremendous 
fluctuations in abundance and catches. Most vessel owners believe that some of the ecological 
issues facing the fishery cannot be mitigated. Squid are a short-lived species which can be 
affected by environmental conditions in a much more drastic way than longer lived species. 
An entire cohort can be wiped out by an environmental event such as extremely cold water, 
extremely hot weather, a turbidity event, or similar natural occurrences. 
4.2.3 Local businesses 
The local squid companies have most of their direct linkages with suppliers and operations in 
Port Elizabeth. The fishermen, however, do most of their spending locally. Since 65% of costs 
are labour related, and are contractually linked to the catch, the health of the resource affects 
local worker expenditure directly. Many of the linkages to the local economy take the form of 
spending on basic goods and services. Most fishermen surveyed live with their families. To 
understand how local businesses are affected by squid volatility, consider the implications for 
the local economy if the resource crashes. As shown in figure 2, the resource is known for its 
volatility. The link between the resource and the local ‘non-fishing’ economy is direct. Though 
the bulk of corporate expenditure tends to occur in Port Elizabeth, workers’ wages, which make 
up roughly 60% of operating costs, are spent locally. It is therefore no surprise that the local 
economy suffers when catches are poor into the local towns.  
Information from the interviews reveals that the worst year ever for businesses was during the 
2013 fall in the squid stock, during which a number of local businesses reported having had to 
let go of workers, whilst some closed down, multiplying the local loss of income. Discussants 
reported that fifteen local businesses were either bankrupted, or so indebted as to temporarily 
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close down.2 When businesses were asked how to mitigate the impact of low catches, most 
replied that not much could be done on their side. 
4.2.4 Recommendations  
There is no doubt that management of the squid resource through closed seasons and 
restrictions on total allowable effort and imposes on short term hardship on squid fishermen 
and local firms. However, there are no realistic alternatives to these tools. Fishing into breeding 
aggregations has advantages, but sustainability unfortunately requires the existence of ‘no-
take’ periods. While this is well understood by management, it is not widely grasped by the 
fishermen themselves, and seems a cause of deep resentment. A low-cost and important 
intervention would be a simple scheme to educate fishers as to the reality of the problem. It is 
difficult to compare the fishing industry, particularly the squid industry, to other industries 
(e.g., the mining industry). A complete policy framework for the squid industry would need to 
involve more education for all role-players, especially the fishermen. It would also need to 
include command and control regulation, by setting a quota for number of fish that could be 
caught, adding a fiscal policy (tax) in the form of a “Per unit tax” on the quantity of fish caught, 
and lastly, using an Individual Tradable Quota (ITQ) which would determine the optimal 
harvest and the number of licenses, auction or grandfathering that allows license owners to rent 
(one or multiple years) or to fish for multiple species. 
The issues raised in the chokka squid industry, at least for now, include two imperatives: to 
ensure sustainability and to achieve transformation. Viewing it in surplus production terms, it 
is established that the resource has already been mined below BMSY, any further allocation of 
fishing rights would therefore have to be at the expense of existing operations. There is a zero-
sum dimension to this problem. The question arises: would there be any benefit to adding 
further control systems to the present use of TAE and closed seasons? 
Economists tend to favour taxes over command and control techniques, arguing that they are 
both more effective and more cost-efficient. A lump sum tax, on the vessel or as a license fee, 
is supposed to be non-distortionary and therefore may appear particularly attractive. A tax can 
lead to a static-efficient sustainable yield allocation because the tax revenues represent transfer 
costs and not real-resource costs. These transfer costs might involve the transfer of resources 
from one part of society to another. On the other hand, a tax represents an increase in costs, 
                                                             
2 These unrecorded numbers were given in conversation and are unverified, but are indicative of perceptions 
amongst local enterprises. 
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and taxes tend to be shifted. Since they cannot be shifted forward into the international market, 
they are likely to go backward - and would not be sustainable as the fishermen, who are the 
least able to pay, would be the ones most affected.  
South Africa uses Individual Quotas in many of its fisheries, but these are not officially 
tradable. For squid, however, they are effort quotas rather than catch rights. As indicated 
earlier, trade in IQs does take place in reality. If this practice is legalized, it has the potential to 
increase efficiency and plausibly state revenues since, in the next round of rights allocations, 
permits could be grandfathered or auctioned, or possibly a mix of the two. 
With regard to the fishermen, if we consider Marx’s definition of pure socialism as from each 
fishermen according to his ability and to each according to his labour, this would require an 
analysis of whether the new labour contract that is to be enacted in 2018 is fundamentally 
socialist in nature. The weakness in this hypothesis is that effort is constrained, so that factors 
cannot be added to reach an equilibrium. The controller of the capital is still able to dominate 
the functional distribution of income. It would be interesting to see if it would be any different 
if workers themselves received the permit and vessel owners had to bid against each other for 
these workers (and the permit they owned). In theory, this would be beneficial, but the 
community of fishermen is unstable and the process seems unworkable. 
The ‘share contract’ would appear to remain the best remuneration system for the industry. 
Currently, there are no feasible ways to address the three important factors that influence the 
share contract in South Africa: the risk appetite of the vessel owner (risk adverse or neutral or 
taker), the competitive labour market, and regulation in the sector. With the share contract, the 
vessel owner can spread some of the risks to the crew, reducing the risk cost.  
Proposing key reform structures in the squid industry of the Eastern Cape would be less 
effective if the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard are not clearly recognized. If 
quota is given to new entrants who do not have vessels, they might go into partnership with 
foreign vessel owners. This is a risk in all of South Africa’s fisheries. Should South Africa have 
foreign vessels in its waters, other serious problems are likely to follow. This might be even 
more problematic if such vessels hire foreign crew. Since the fish is caught on the sea, this is a 
situation where a coastal water state (the principal) contracts with the distant water state (agent 
or fishing companies) to do fishing in the water under the jurisdiction of the coastal water state. 
The principal might not always know the right type of the agent, which it is usually assumed 
are of two types: low-cost and high-cost agents. In short, this creates space for illegal landings 
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and catch distortions. This usually occurs when moral hazard is associated with the catches that 
are reported. Fishermen and owners have private information about their catches. Monitoring 
and observing catches is in many case too costly and is often not done efficiently in the Eastern 
Cape. Because accurate information about real catches is important, there is an incentive 
problem when the information is kept private. If the total real catch is higher than the level set 
by the regulator, there may ultimately be an unsustainable harvest level, leading to direct short- 
and long-term economic losses. Since the true “real” catch remains unknown, the assessment 
of the level of stock will be uncertain, leading to a situation where the assessment of a current 
stock is different from the real and existing stock. This has implications for policy formulation. 
Policies are formulated as a function of the state of stock biomass and other measures might 
need to be introduced to deal with the squid industry in the Eastern Cape properly. 
For future in-depth research, a study is needed that would employ a correctly extended input-
output model and correctly specify the SAM method. Although the present study was aimed at 
understanding the industry and the key role-players, it would be useful to get as many 
observations as possible for any future study. This will allow the future study to use statistical 
methods of analyzing the areas concerned. Also the present study ignores Port Elizabeth, which 
is where the majority of fishing expenditure by the companies takes place.  
Getting the right policies to mitigate the problems of depleting stock faced by the chokka squid 
industry can be complicated. The industry has two closed seasons, and any proposal of 
additional longer periods of non-fishing is likely to make both companies and fishermen poor. 
A strategy is needed to catch the chokka squid when it is in abundance, and such a strategy 
must be in line with the Schaefer model that suggests that there is less effort when the resource 
is scarce. The economic viability of sending boats to sea strongly influences the decision of 
whether to fish (apply effort) or not. Local businesses see the closed seasons as painful but 
interesting, as they believe it might be the best plan currently since it appears to be working. 
This could, however, just be a coincidence and we would need a longer period of assessment 
to be able to respond with any degree of confidence. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
The chokka squid industry is a small but valuable fishery. The study focused on three areas: 
Humansdorp, Jeffreys’ Bay and St. Francis. The analysis of the chokka squid industry 
highlighted the key role-players and the additional momentum provided to local. Problems 
facing the squid industry cannot be easily mitigated, but the industry needs proper planning 
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and management. The results suggests a strong message to the resource decision-makers in a 
political setting: that it is possible for all agents to facilitate and support the industry, and to 
work together to ensure that thousands of jobs are rescued, by avoiding the depletion of the 
squid stock. To do this will contribute immensely to reducing poverty in these three areas. The 
threat is not from fishermen, nor from companies, as the resource is managed and the system 
of closed seasons secures it. However, before any attempt to extend rights to new entrants, a 
politically tempting prospect, it is necessary to recognize some fundamental realities of the 
impact caused by the high volatility of this resource. Collective action problems beset all area-
wide initiatives. As this is the first phase of an on-going study, there is a need to conduct future 
research on area-wide initiatives, including a survey of fishermen from Port Elizabeth, which 
might need better statistical methods able to handle large data, giving a less unbiased and more 
robust results. These might include a quantitative approach to analyzing the data. Above all, it 
is also critical to the health of the stock being harvested, keeping in mind that while one can 
invest in vessels, one must also invest in the fish themselves, and letting a depleted stock 
recover may be much cheaper, and may offer a better return, than buying more boats. 
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7 APPENDICES  
Appendix 1: Squid catches in the period of 2003-2014 
 
Source: Status of the South African Marine Fishery Resources 2016 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire 
 
 
RESEARCH TOPIC: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE SQUID STOCK VOLATILITY IN THE 
EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Semi-structured interview 
 
I am conducting a research based on the above mentioned topic within the University of Cape Town, School of 
Economics. The purpose of this research project is investigating the extent and adaption measures to social and 
economic impacts through understanding the structure and economics of the industrial side of the fishery, 
assessing of the low catches on the industrial and fisher components and give recommendation of potential 
mitigation measures for periods of low catch. I would be grateful if you would assist me by allowing me to 
complete this questionnaire/semi-structured interview on you as it will not take more than 15 minutes to 
complete and I bind myself that the information you shall provide will only be used for this academic research 
and will be highly confidential. Your participation in this research is voluntary. You can choose to withdraw from 
the research at any time. This research has been approved by the Ethics in Research Committee of the Commerce 
Faculty of the University of Cape Town. 
 
SECTION A:    BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
 
INSTRUCTIONS TO RESPONDENT 
This semi-structured interview must be answered by people working (fulltime/part-time) in the squid sector only 
Unless instructed otherwise, please complete by marking an X in the appropriate shaded block. 
 
1. RACE 
1 2 3 4 
 
5 6 
BLACK COLOURED INDIAN WHITE 
 
OTHER PREFER NOT TO SAY 
 
Tribal affiliation (if any) 
 
 
GENDER 
1 2 
 
3 
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MALE FEMALE  
 
PREFER NOT TO SAY 
 
 
3. DATE OF BIRTH: 
 
 
 
 
4. FIRST DATE OF EMPLOYMENT AS SQUID FISHER 
 
 
5.	NATURE	OF	POST?	
	1	 2	 3	
	FULLTIME	 PART-TIME	 OTHER		
		If	OTHER	please	specify	
 
6.	WHAT	IS	YOUR	LEVEL	OF	EDUCATION?	No	schooling	 1	Primary	 2	Secondary	 3	Tertiary	 4	Other	(Specify)	 5	
 
7.	HOW	MANY	PEOPLE	ARE	RESIDING	IN	YOUR	HOUSEHOLD?		1	 2	 3	 4		Less	than	3	 4	-	6	 7 - 10	 More than 10	
 
8. ARE YOU THE ONLY BREADWINNER IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD? 
YES 1 
NO 2 
9. IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO Q8, HOW MANY OTHER INCOME EARNERS ARE THERE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD? 
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 1 
  
10. HOW MANY DEPENDENTS ARE THERE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD? 
 1 
 
11. WHAT IS YOUR AREA OF RESIDENCE(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) FOR THE MOST OF THE YEAR? 
Rural area 1 
Urban area 2 
ADDRESS: 3 
 
Municipalities:	 
 
SECTION B 
1. What is your job responsibility in the squid industry? 
 
 
 
2. a) In the last 6 months prior to working here , did you work fulltime?  
 
b) If yes, please describe the job you held. 
 
 
3. Do you enjoy this job you are doing or is it because there is no better alternative? 
 
 
 
4. Which of the following options provided below best describes the situation in the squid industry?  
There is no crisis in the squid industry, there is job security and the media is overreacting.  
A crisis exists and is causing a threat to job security, the productivity of the region and the 
country. A crisis of this type needs to be addressed at the national level through effective policy 
planning and the development of strategies for awareness education and vocational training. 
 
A crisis may exist but it is not that serious and everyone’s job is secured thus, there is no sense 
of job insecurity. 
 
NONE OF THE ABOVE  
 
5. In your view, is the government doing enough to uplift the lives of general fishermen in this region? 
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YES  
NO  
NOT SURE  
 
If Yes or No, give a reason for your response 
 
 
 
6. How many trips do you make in a year and how long was your last trip? 
 
 
 
7. In the boats you have worked in, is there a basic wage or salary before “catch bonus” (How salaries are 
organized)? 
 
 
 
 
 
8. In the last year or season, what was the most, least and average catches of squid by any other fishermen? 
Most  
Least  
Average  
 
9. From the time you started working, what has been the variation in your catches? 
 
 
 
 
10. In your own understanding, how much does the best and average person earn? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. During the closed-season, what do you do? (What do you spend your time doing and where?) 
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12. Do you have an alternative job or other means of getting money (between trips and in closed-seasons)? 
 
 
 
 
13. What programmes and trainings do you think can be implemented to improve the lives of fishermen?  
  
 
 
 
14. If you were not able to fish, what would be your next best job? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU 
 
